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ROBINSON v. WALLS
Automobile Driver Cannot Be Held To A Normal
Degree Of Care Under Extraordinary
Circumstances
Robinson v. Walls'
The defendant, after leaving his employer's restaurant,
was held up by a former employee, forced to turn over all
the cash in his possession, and told to get into his car
and drive as directed, with the robber taking a position
directly behind the driver. After riding for more than ten
minutes, the defendant felt there was little hope for his
survival, and decided to take a calculated risk. With the
car in motion, and after seeing that there were no pedes-
trians or moving cars in the vicinity, he jumped from his
car and ran. The robber, while attempting to control the
car, struck the parked unoccupied cars of the plaintiffs,
causing damage to each. The plaintiffs brought this suit
asserting that the defendant was negligent in abandoning
his car while in motion, and that this negligence resulted
in the damage to their cars.
The court held that the circumstances under which the
defendant acted constituted an emergency situation, and
that under the doctrine of emergency he could not be held
liable for the resulting damage to the plaintiff's automo-
biles. In so holding, the court indicated that the defendant
acted not only prudently, but more intelligently than most
people under such circumstances.
To determine the issue of defendant's liability, two basic
questions must be answered: first, did the defendant act
as a reasonable and prudent man by exercising the proper
degree of care in this particular situation; and second,
assuming the defendant was negligent in his actions, were
such actions the proximate cause of the resulting damage?
It has long been established that one is not negligent if
he has used the same quantum of care as would have been
exercised by a reasonable man under like circumstances.
That degree of care has been described as that which ex-
perience has found necessary to prevent injury to others
in like cases.2 The circumstances of each particular case
must be taken into consideration to determine the proper
degree of care that one owes in respect to another's person
'People's Court of 'Baltimore City (No. 25189-58), reported In the Daily
Record, August 22, 1959 (Md. 1959).
'P., W. & B. RR. Co. v. Kerr, 25 Md. 521, 530 (1866).
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or property.3 The doctrine of emergency, which holds the
actor not liable for taking a course of action which results
in disaster if such action was taken in a situation which
arose suddenly and unexpectedly, would operate to lower
the required level of care, so as to find an act done, without
opportunity for deliberation, not negligent."
In Burhans v. Burhans,5 it was held that the driver was
not negligent when, is swerving to avoid a dog, she over-
turned the car, injuring the occupants. The court said, in
this opinion:
"Because of the peril of the position in which she [the
driver] was placed.., and the possible consequences
resulting from a collision . . .she is not held to the
same accuracy of judgment as is required of her under
ordinary circumstances. And though a course of ac-
tion other than that which she pursued might have
been more judicious, she is not to be held liable for
her error of judgment in pursuing the course she did,
if, in doing so, she acted with such care and caution
as -ordinarily prudent persons would have exercised
under the stress of like circumstances. 6
In applying the doctrine to the facts of the instant case,
there is difficulty in meeting the requirement that to be an
emergency, there must be a sudden and unexpected situa-
tion, such as to deprive the actor of all opportunity for
deliberation.' In the case of the automobile driver, it is
held that the emergency doctrine cannot be applied where
a driver has had an opportunity to exercise his deliberate
judgment between alternative courses of action.'
8Kent County v. Pardee, 151 Md. 68, 75-76, 134 A. 33 (1926); Yellow
Cab Co. v. Lacy, 165 Md. 588, 596, 170 A. 190 (1934).
'PROSSER, TORTS (2d ed. 1955) 137, § 32.
'159 Md. 370, 150 A. 795 (1930).
Ibid., 375. Other cases reaching a similar result include Baker v.
Shettle, 194 Md. 666, 72 A. 2d 30 (1950) ; Coastal Tank Lines v. Carroll,
205 Md. 137, 106 A. 2d 98 (1954); Brehm v. Lorenz, 206 Md. 500, 112
A. 2d 475 (1955) ; Mason v. Triplett, 217 Md. 433. 141 A. 2d 708 (1958).7 1PROSSE, loc. cit., supra, n. 4. "Sudden and unexpected" restriction
applied in Hercules ,Power Co. v. Crawford, 163 F. 2d 968 (8th Cir.
1947) ; Kaestner v. Milwaukee Automobile Ins. Co., 254 Wis. 12, 35 N.W.
2d 190 (1948) ; Horton Motor Lines v. Currie, 92 F. 2d 164 (4th Cir.
1937) ; Henderson v. Land, 42 Wyo. 369, 295 P. 271 (1931).
860 C.J.S., § 257. "Sudden and unexpected" restriction applied in
Horton Motor Lines v. Currie, 92 F. 2d- 164 (4th Cir. 1937) ; Poneitowcki
v. Harres, 200 Wis. 504, 228 N.W. 126 (1929); Bloxom v. McCoy, 178 Va.
343, 17 S.E. 2d 401 (1941). Similar restrictions are found in 1 CYCLOPEDIA
OF AUTOMOBiLE LAW (1948), Part 2, § 668. Recent Maryland cases in
point are: Lehmann v. Johnson, 218 Md. 343, 146 A. 2d 886 (1958) and
Warnke v. Essex, 217 Md. 183, 141 A. 2d 728 (1958).
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The defendant had been in the perilous situation of
being forced to drive at gunpoint for more than ten min-
utes. He testified that he took a calculated risk when he
decided to jump from his automobile, which apparently
involved a decision between two alternatives: (1) Re-
main in his automobile and take his chances with this
"desperate criminal", or (2) Jump from the car, causing
possible injury to himself as well as to other persons and
their property. The first alternative was obviously re-
jected, and the second chosen only after ascertaining that
there were no pedestrians or moving cars nearby. It is
clear that the defendant made a definite, deliberate decision
in his taking this calculated risk and that his abandoning
the car was no mere impulse; and therefore, the situation
does not actually fall within the strict definition of an
emergency.
In Lange v. Affleck, the driver of an automobile had
ample opportunity, although less actual time than in the
instant case, to observe the approaching danger of an on-
coming automobile pulling into the wrong lane preparatory
to making a left turn, yet he made no decision as to a
course of action which would avoid an accident until the
last moment, so that the accident occurred anyhow. Here,
the court, disallowed any claim of emergency because the
necessary elements of suddenness, unexpectedness and
lack of time for deliberation were missing. However, com-
pare Cordas v. Peerless Transportation Co.,' in which it
was held that an emergency was present, where a fleeing
criminal jumped into the defendant's cab and ordered the
operator to drive away. The driver leapt from the moving
cab within seconds when he realized the nature of his
passenger, giving the element of suddenness and unex-
pectedness, thereby distinguishing it from the Walls case.
Assuming that the defendant's act of abandoning his
moving automobile was negligent, however, it becomes
necessary to determine if the negligent act was the proxi-
mate cause of the damage. Where a chain of events has
been started due to the alleged negligence of the driver of
an automobile, he may be held liable for all mishaps which
are properly the proximate results of the improper con-
duct."
The principal means of attacking this doctrine of proxi-
mate cause is to show an intervening cause in the chain of
160 Md. 695, 155 A.. 150 (1931).
• 27 N.Y.S. 2d 198 (1941).60 C.J...S., § 255.
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events that was sufficient to supersede the driver's original
negligence. 2 In Bloom v. Good Humor Ice Cream Co. of
Baltimore," the doctrine of superseding intervening cause
was held to relieve the defendant ice cream truck driver of
negligence, if any, in his inviting a child to a place of dan-
ger by having him cross the street to make a purchase,
because the acts of the child and the approach of the car
which struck him were intervening causes superseding
the defendant's act of negligence. So it may reasonably be
argued that in the present case the criminal's attempts to
steer the car after the defendant had jumped were the
intervening causes, and would thus relieve the defendant of
liability by superseding his act of jumping.
However, the mere fact that another cause has inter-
vened between the defendant's negligence and damage for
which recovery is sought, is not of itself sufficient in law
to relieve the defendant of liability; and if the damage is
the natural and probable consequence of the original act,
or is such as might reasonably have been forseen as proba-
ble, the original wrongdoer is liable notwithstanding the
intervening act or event. 4 Also, an intervening act of a
person which is the normal response to the stimulus of
a situation created by the actor's negligent conduct is not
a superseding cause.15 And in addition, if the occurrence
of the intervening cause might have reasonably been an-
ticipated by the wrongdoer as a probable consequence of
his own negligence, such intervening cause will not inter-
rupt the connection between the original cause and the
damage. 6
These restrictions would most likely operate to defeat
any contention that the criminal's attempts at steering
the abandoned automobile were an intervening cause. It
is obvious that damage to property would be a reasonably
forseeable consequence of abandoning a moving car. Like-
wise, the fact that where the driver of a moving car had
abandoned it the normal response of a passenger would
be to try to control it, would prevent such conduct from
being an intervening superseding cause. And finally, such
attempts at controlling the moving car should have been
reasonably forseeable, and the defendant should have ex-
12 This doctrine is set out in 65 C.J.S., 685, § 111 and upheld in Garbes
v. Apatoff, 192 Md. 12, 63 A. 2d 307 (1949).
179 Md. 384, 18 A. 2d 592 (1941).
1 4 Brown v. New York Cent. R. Co., 53 F. 2d 490, 491 (E.D. Mich. 1931).
5 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS (1934) § 443. Also 65 C.J.S., 695-696, § 111.
16 State of Maryland v. Hecht Company, 165 Md. 415, 422, 169 A. 311
(1933).
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pected such to happen when he chose to abandon the auto-
mobile.
It would seem therefore, that not only is the defendant
unable to avail himself of the emergency doctrine as a
means of finding his act to be non-negligent, but that the
doctrine of superseding cause cannot be invoked to re-
lease the defendant from liability for the damage resulting
from his act.
Yet how does the law expect a reasonable man to act
in such a situation? Although the principle that a person
is to be held responsible for any injury he causes is the
foundation of all tort law, the theory that "One assaulted
and in peril of his life may run through the close of an-
other to escape from his assailant,"' 7 has a definite place in
the development of tort law to its present state. In Ploof
v. Putnam,8 a well known case that did much to promote
this theory, the court held that "One may sacrifice the per-
sonal property of another to save his life or the lives of
his fellows." 19 This theory has become known as the doc-
trine of necessity; and, although it does not abolish liability
for actual damage done, it could certainly operate to lower
the level of care required of the defendant in the instant
case and prevent the recovery of any punitive damages.
A person being forced to drive with a gun in his back
has every reason to believe that his life is in danger. The
concept of self preservation cannot be so disregarded as
to consider a person guilty of a negligent act in attempting
to save his life; and, even though his actions resulted in
certain property damage, it cannot be said that the defend-
ant acted without reason because of the necessity of the
situation.
To summarize the effect of the decision in this case,
it can be said that a reasonable decision made by someone
in a perilous situation to save his own life by taking a
course of action which results in certain damage, is not
to be considered a negligent act because the normal degree
of care required of a driver cannot be required of a person
in such a perilous situation. The instant case thereby
demonstrates a tendency to expand upon the limitations of
the doctrine of emergency.
HARRY E. SILVERWOOD, JR.
rY 37 Hen. VII, pl. 26.
81 Vt. 471, 71 A. 188 (1908).
1Ibid., 189.
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